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Abstract: 
The sinking of the Titanic in April 1912 took the lives of 68 percent of the 
people aboard. Who survived? It was women and children who had a higher 
probability of being saved, not men. Likewise, people traveling in first class had 
a better chance of survival than those in second and third class. British 
passengers were more likely to perish than members of other nations.  
This extreme event represents a rare case of a well-documented life and death 
situation where social norms were enforced. This paper shows that economic 
analysis can account for human behavior in such situations. 
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II ..   Introduction  
During the night of April 14, 1912, the Titanic collided with an iceberg on her maiden 
voyage. Two hours and forty minutes later she sank, resulting in the loss of 1,517 
lives—more than two-thirds of her 2,207 passengers and crew.1 This remains one of 
the deadliest peacetime maritime disasters in history and by far the most famous.
2
 It is 
one of those rare events that are imprinted on human memory, like President 
Kennedy’s assassination, the first moon landing, and the terrorist attacks on the Twin 
Towers on 9/11. The disaster came as a great shock to many because the vessel was 
equipped with the most advanced technology at that time, had an experienced crew, 
and was thought to be (practically) ―unsinkable.‖3 
 The myths surrounding the Titanic disaster were kept alive by the many 
attempts to find her wreckage. It was not until 1985 that a joint American-French 
expedition, led by Jean-Louis Michel and Dr. Robert Ballard, located the wreckage 
and collected approximately 6,000 artifacts, which were later shown in a successful 
exhibition that toured the world. 
 The Titanic’s fame was enhanced by the considerable number of films made 
about it, especially the 1997 production of Titanic, which was directed by James 
Cameron and starred Leonardo DiCaprio and Kate Winslet.
4
 It was (at the time) the 
most expensive film ever made, costing approximately US$200 million, and was 
funded by Paramount Pictures and 20th Century Fox. The film was a major 
commercial and critical success. It is the highest grossing film of all time, earning 
US$1.8 billion, and it won eleven Academy Awards, tying with Ben Hur and The 
Lord of the Rings: The Return of the King for the most Oscars won by a movie. 
 The extent of the tragedy is mainly because there were too few lifeboats on the 
Titanic. The vessel carried only 20 lifeboats, which could accommodate 1,178 people, 
or 52 percent of the people aboard.
5
 As the Titanic did not show any signs of being in 
imminent danger, passengers were reluctant to leave the apparent security of the 
                                                   
1
 For accounts of the disaster, see, for example, Lord (1955, 1986), Eaton and Haas (1994), Quinn 
(1999) and Ruffman (1999), as well as the Encyclopedia Titanica (www.encyclopedia–titanica.org) and 
the information provided by RMS Titanic, Inc. that were granted ―salvor-in-possession‖ rights to the 
wreck by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (www.titanic-online.com).  
2
 The Titanic’s death toll was exceeded by the explosion and sinking of the steamboat Sultana on the 
Mississippi River in 1985 when 1,700 people perished. The worst peacetime maritime disaster 
happened in 1987 when the passenger ferry Doña Paz collided with an oil tanker and caught fire. The 
sinking of the ferry claimed between 1,500 and 4,000 lives. However, the worst maritime disasters 
happened during wartime. For instance, the sinking of the Wilhelm Gustloff by Soviet submarines in 
January 1945 caused the deaths of between 7,000 and 9,000 people. The Titanic is not the only major 
vessel that did not survive her maiden voyage. The British RMS Tayleur in 1854 and the Danish Hans 
Hedthoft in 1995 were also technically innovative vessels that sank on their first trip. The famous 
Gustav Vasa met with the same fate in 1628; it capsized while still in port at Stockholm. 
3
 In contrast to popular mythology, the Titanic was never described as ―unsinkable‖ without 
qualification. The notion entered the public’s consciousness only after the sinking (see Howell 1999). 
See, in general, Tierney (2006). 
4
 For example, Saved from the Titanic (1912), In Nacht und Eis (1912), Atlantic (1929), Titanic (1943 
and 1953), A Night to Remember (1958), Raise the Titanic! (1980). In addition, there were several TV 
movies and series. 
5
 There were more lifeboats than required by the rules of the British Board of Trade, which were 
drafted in 1894 and which determined the number of lifeboats required by a ship’s gross register 
tonnage, rather than the number of persons aboard. 
 
 
 
 
3 
vessel to board small lifeboats. The panicking deck crew exacerbated the situation 
further at the beginning by launching lifeboats that were partially empty. As a 
consequence, there was an even greater demand for lifeboat places when the 
remaining passengers finally realized that the ship was indeed sinking. People 
struggling to survive had to compete with other people aboard for a place in the few 
remaining lifeboats. Failure to secure a seat virtually guaranteed death because the 
average ocean temperature was about 2 degrees Celsius (35 degrees Fahrenheit); any 
survivors of the sinking vessel left in the water would have quickly frozen to death. 
Only a handful of swimmers were rescued from the water.
6
 
 Our paper analyzes the determinants of who is more likely to survive such a 
tragic event. This is an interesting issue in itself as the probability of survival differs 
greatly between individuals. For example, according to the official casualty figures, 
men traveling first class were much more likely to survive than men in second and 
third class, and nearly all women traveling in first class survived compared to women 
traveling in the other two classes.
7
 Yet, the Titanic disaster is also relevant in a more 
general context. It allows us to analyze behavior under extraordinary conditions, 
namely in a life and death situation. Do human beings behave more in line with the 
selfish homo oeconomicus, where everybody is out for himself or herself and possibly 
even puts other people’s lives in danger? If that were the case, we would expect that 
physically stronger people, that is, adult males, would have a higher probability of 
survival than women, children, and older people. Otherwise, when it comes to a life or 
death decision, are human beings capable of unselfishness and perhaps even 
chivalrous behavior? The answer to this question is open.
8
 Some economists argue 
that the tendency to act selfishly arises when the stakes are high; in particular, when 
survival is at stake. Other economists are less certain.
9
 In contrast, sociobiologists 
argue that under such circumstances genetic influences become more powerful, 
resulting in more women of childbearing age being saved than those not of 
childbearing age or men. The study of the sinking of the Titanic may also have major 
policy consequences beyond what was implemented shortly after the disaster.
10
 Thus, 
provided unselfish behavior can be identified, the question then becomes—Do more 
stringent safety regulations crowd out intrinsically moral behavior, and could they 
possibly lead to worse outcomes than less strict regulations? The data available to us 
can be considered to be the outcome of a quasi-natural experiment; the disaster 
occurred due to an exogenous event, and the resulting life and death situation affected 
all persons aboard equally. The tragic event occurred in a closed environment, 
undisturbed by the outside intervention of other agents. 
                                                   
6
 Anecdotal evidence taken from U.S. Senate Inquiry (1912). 
7
 Titanic Disaster: Official Casualty Figures and Commentary (http://www.anesi.com/ 
titanic.htm). 
8
 Helping behavior has been shown to exist under particular circumstances; see, for example, Worman 
(1979), Batson et al. (1979), Amato (1990), Harrell (1994), and for a survey Eagly and Crowley (1986). 
9
 This issue has been debated and experimentally analyzed in the context of high-stakes games. See, for 
example, Fehr et al. (2002), Camerer (2003), and Camerer and Fehr (2006). For life or death decisions, 
see more generally Howard (1979, 1980), Shepard and Zeckhauser (1984), Slonim and Roth (1998), 
and Smith and Keeney (2005). 
10
 The sinking of the Titanic led to the first International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea in 
London on November 12, 1913, resulting in a treaty that was to go into effect on July 1, 1915, but 
which was delayed by World War I. It established the International Ice Patrol to monitor and report on 
the location of North Atlantic icebergs that could pose a threat to shipping. In addition, it was agreed 
that all passenger vessels must have sufficient lifeboats for everyone aboard, safety drills must be 
instituted, and radio communication must be operated 24 hours a day. 
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 We proceed by first developing the theoretically grounded hypotheses of what 
determined the survival probability of the people aboard the Titanic. Section II 
discusses the data we use, and Section III presents the econometric estimates, 
including various robustness tests. The first set of hypotheses relate to economic 
determinants. Our estimates suggest that the first-class passengers’ income and wealth 
greatly helped in saving their lives as compared to the second-class passengers, and 
even more so the third-class passengers. The crew had access to more informational 
and relational resources and therefore had a higher survival chance than the 
passengers, in particular, the deck crew. The second set of hypotheses deal with 
natural determinants. We find that people in their prime (ages 15–35) had a higher 
chance of survival than older people. Women of reproductive age and women with 
children also had a higher probability of being rescued, which speaks for the 
sociobiological approach. The third set of hypotheses refers to various social 
determinants of survival. It seems that (at least to some extent) the social norm that 
―women and children first‖ was followed in this situation, overcoming completely 
selfish behavior. The British passengers did not, or could not, take advantage of being 
on a British ship; indeed, passengers from the USA had a higher survival probability 
than citizens of other nations. Section IV concludes by drawing general consequences 
for the behavior of human beings in life or death situations. 
 
II II ..   Theoretical  Hypotheses  about  Who  Is Expected To  Be Saved  
Economists have mainly studied the consequences of disasters by analyzing the 
effects for the short, medium, and long term, following the path-breaking 
contributions by Hirshleifer (1963) and Dacy and Kunreuther (1969).
11
 Psychologists 
and sociologists, on the other hand, focus more on the behavior of people during 
disasters. Much of the latter literature rejects the idea that during a disastrous event 
many people are stunned, become immobilized, and are unable to act rationally (the 
so-called ―disaster syndrome‖). This literature also rejects the concept that in the 
event of a disaster chaos, panic, social breakdown, and antisocial behavior, such as 
crime, looting, or exploitation, often occur. Indeed, it has been found that morals, 
loyalty, respect for law and customs, and tenets of acceptable behavior do not 
instantly break down with a disaster.
12
 This is consistent with the empirical evidence 
accumulated in behavioral economics (or economic psychology), which shows that 
people do not necessarily exploit an opportunity presented to them when it can hurt 
other people. Rather, they are often inclined to help other people. Substantial evidence 
has been generated that motives such as altruism, fairness, or morality affect the 
behavior of many individuals. People sometimes punish others who have harmed 
them or reward those who have helped them, sacrificing their own wealth (see 
Camerer et al. 2004). People donate blood or organs without being paid and give 
money for charitable purposes. In wartime, many individuals volunteer and are 
willing to take high risks as soldiers (see Elster 2007). Citizens vote in elections, 
incurring more private costs than benefits, and people are paying more taxes than a 
                                                   
11
 Other contributions are, for instance, De Alessi (1975), Sorkin (1982), Albala-Bertrand (1993), 
Grossi and Kunreuther (2005), and Kunreuther and Pauly (2005). Particular attention has been paid to 
insurance against natural disasters, for example, Kunreuther (1996) and Kunreuther and Roth (1998). 
12
 See, for example, Quarantelli (1960, 1972), Johnson (1988), Drabek (1986), Johnson et al. (1994), 
Aguirre et al. (1998), Tierney et al. (2001), and Hancock and Szalma (2008). 
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traditional economics-of-crime model would predict (see Torgler 2007). Individuals 
also help others in many situations on the job (see Drago and Garvey 1998).
13
 
 For our purpose, we develop a simple theoretical framework that allows us to 
develop nine hypotheses (arranged according to whether they belong to what can be 
called ―economic,‖ ―natural,‖ or ―social‖ factors) that can be tested using the data on 
who survived and who perished in the Titanic disaster. The factual knowledge about 
the conditions aboard the Titanic has been gathered from various sources, most 
importantly from the Encyclopedia Titanica and various official accounts as well as 
monographs.
14
 The hypotheses should be understood in the ceteris paribus sense. 
They are not mutually exclusive, but can occur simultaneously. The theoretical 
framework is influenced by tournament theory (see Lazear and Rosen 1981; Nalebuff 
and Stiglitz 1983; and Kräkel 2008) and biological theories on efforts to understand 
fitness in a cooperative animal society, such as the wasp (see Cant and Field 2001). 
 
Surviving the Titanic disaster can be modeled as a tournament with two risk 
averse contestants i and j. Survival (s)
 
can be described as a production function is = 
ii ae  and jjj aes
15
 where e is the effort expended to save oneself, and a is the 
ability to do so. 1, jis  indicates that individual i or j survives and 
0
, jis  that the individual 
does not survive. The ability difference ∆a between individual j and i is: ∆a = 
ij aa . We assume that ∆a 0 . Exerting effort imposes costs on an individual, 
described by the function c( ie ) and c( je ) with c(0) = 0, c  ( jie , ) > 0 and c ( jie , ) > 0. 
The utility functions can be written as: 
 
)()()1()()( 01 iiiiiii ecsupsupeU ii  (1) 
 
)()()()()1()( 01 jjijjijj ecsupsupeU j  (2) 
 
with aeeFssprobp jijii ()( ). In other words, the probability is a 
cumulative distribution based on individual effort and ability difference (see Kräkel 
2008). We normalize the utility of those persons not surviving to )( 0
i
sui = 0 and 
)( 0jj su =0. Thus, we can reformulate equations (1) and (2) as:  
 
)()()( 1 iiiii ecsupeU i  (3) 
 
)()()1()( 1 jjijj ecsupeU j  (4) 
 
                                                   
13
 See, for example, Meier (2006, 2007) for an extensive survey; Ledyard (1995), Camerer and Thaler 
(1995), Camerer (2003), and Frey and Meier (2004) specifically for voluntary contributions to public 
goods; and Eckel and Grossman (1996), Andreoni and Miller (2002), Henrich et al. (2001) for dictator 
and ultimatum games. Surveys on the related topic of fairness are provided, for example, by Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999), Camerer (2003), Konow (2003). 
14
 Official British and American inquiries by The Wreck Commissioner’s Court (1912) and The 
Committee on Commerce (1912). 
15
 The production function is also affected by noise or random shocks, but we assume that both subjects 
are affected identically.  
 
 
 
 
6 
 Agents choose their efforts in order to maximize equations (3) and (4). The 
first-order condition can be written as: 
 
0)()( *1** iiji ecuaeef  (5) 
 
0)()( *1** jjji ecuaeef  (6) 
 
 Equations (5) and (6) indicate that the flatter the density f(.), or in other words 
the higher the survival rate and the steeper the cost function, the lower the equilibrium 
effort of an agent will be. Moreover, the stronger the ability disadvantage, a , the 
higher the survival rate. On the other hand, the more i tries to generate a relative effort 
advantage, ( ** ji ee ), the lower the survival rate. Furthermore, an individual’s 
incentive to survive increases with an increase in the value of surviving because 
0/ 1,
1
, jiji su . In addition, an individual requires less effort to survive if his marginal 
costs are lower. These findings allow us to develop several testable hypotheses with 
regard to economic and natural determinants. 
 
A.  Economic Determinants (E) 
The 1,316 passengers on the Titanic were divided into three different classes: 325 in 
first class, 285 in second class, and 706 in third class. It is to be expected that the first-
class passengers tried to obtain the same preferential treatment with respect to lifeboat 
access that they generally received on the vessel. People with more income and 
wealth, such as first-class passengers, are more able to secure a place on a lifeboat 
than people of lesser economic means. Thus, they have a relative ability advantage 
compared to the second- and third-class passengers. They were used to giving orders 
to employees (in this case the crew), and they were better able to bargain, in the 
extreme case even offering financial rewards. They were also in closer contact with 
the upper echelon crewmembers (in particular, First Officer Murdoch, who 
commanded the loading of lifeboats on the starboard side, and Second Officer 
Lightoller, who did the same on the port side). Moreover, the first-class passengers 
had better access to information about the imminent danger and were aware that the 
lifeboats were located close to the first-class cabins. Thus, their marginal effort costs 
to survive were lower. In contrast, most third-class passengers had no idea where the 
lifeboats were located (safety drills for all passengers were introduced after the 
Titanic disaster), and they did not know how to reach the upper decks where the 
lifeboats were stowed. A relative advantage in the ability, the effort, and the marginal 
costs raises the probability of survival, leading to the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis E1: First-class passengers have a higher probability of survival than 
second-class passengers; second-class passengers, in turn, have a higher probability 
of survival than third-class passengers. 
 
 One would expect the experienced crew of 886 men and women to be better 
prepared for a catastrophic event, to be earlier and better informed about the location 
of lifeboats and the danger of sinking, and to have closer personal contacts with the 
crewmembers in charge of loading the lifeboats. This gives them a relative advantage 
over passengers regarding saving their own lives (relative ability and effort/cost 
advantage). On the other hand, it is their duty to help save passengers, and they are 
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only supposed to abandon a sinking ship when that task has been fulfilled. We expect 
that in life or death situations, such as that encountered on the Titanic, selfish interests 
tend to dominate. 
 
Hypothesis E2: Crewmembers have a higher probability of survival than passengers. 
 
 Not all crewmembers benefited from the same favorable conditions. Some of 
the conditions just mentioned are more likely to apply to the deck crew (who was, for 
instance, in charge of manning the lifeboats) or the engine crew (who had information 
about the damage done to the ship). The crew directly responsible for passenger 
amenities (victualing and a la carte crew) did not have the same information as the 
deck and engine crews. Therefore, the deck and engine crewmembers could use their 
comparative advantage to increase their chances of survival. We may also observe a 
―closeness effect.‖ The officers directing the loading of the lifeboats and deciding 
which crew went with which boat were members of the deck crew. They would have 
been somewhat biased towards those of their own work group. 
 
Hypothesis E3: The deck and engine crewmembers have a higher chance of survival 
than other crewmembers. 
 
B. Natural Determinants (N) 
Based on the theoretical framework, we are also able to cover natural (biological) 
determinants. In the situation of a large excess demand for places in the lifeboats, a 
selfish homo oeconomicus, faced with life or death, would fight to be able to board a 
lifeboat. People with greater physical strength, that is, people in their prime, would 
have an advantage over older people in the fight for survival. Physical strength is 
correlated with higher ability and lower marginal effort costs in the event of such a 
disaster. Thus, we can develop the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis N1: People in their prime have a higher chance of survival than older 
people. 
 
 As a next step, let us assume that some people onboard the Titanic make the 
effort to help others survive. For example, let us assume that j is willing to help i and 
that the utility function depends on the level of relatedness (r) between individuals, 
where 0/ ,, jiji ru . Moreover, we assume that j is prepared to make additional 
efforts to help i (e.g., due to moral costs). We define individual i’s fitness to survive 
without help as 0iF  and individual j’s fitness to survive without helping as 
0
jF . This 
model of helping behavior is similar to biological studies conducted on helping effort 
and fitness in cooperative animal societies (see Cant and Field 2001), assuming that 
individuals have interdependent preferences (see, e.g., Becker 1974; Sobel 2005). The 
fitness level of j due to helping h can be written as: 
 
h
jF
0
jF (1 –  h)    
   (7) 
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where h is the level of h and  the cost of helping (cost per unit of help 
extended). Thus, hjF is a decreasing function of h. The maximum possible 
level of help would be 1/ , where hjF 0.  
 Individual j’s investment in h increases the survival probability of individual i. 
Helping investment, I(h), is subject to diminishing benefits in terms of efficiency so 
that I(h) is a positive but decelerating function of h. The level of investment is taken 
to be driven by society’s helping norms, n (e.g., ―women and children first‖). Thus, 
the helping investment, I(h), can be written as: 
 
I(h) = n(1 - qhe )   
   (8) 
where q determines how rapidly the marginal investment of help 
diminishes. This allows us to define new utility functions for i and j: 
 
U hj =
h
jF  + r I(h)   
   (9)  
U h
i
=  0iF + I(h) + r 
h
jF   
  (10) 
 
 
The utility function of individual i(j) is positively correlated with a higher survival 
rate of j(i), which means that preferences are interdependent. Substituting equations 
(7) and (8) with (9) and (10) leads to: 
 
 
U hj =
0
jF (1 –  h)  + r n(1 - 
qhe )   
   (11)  
U hi = 
0
iF +  n(1 - 
qhe ) + r 0jF (1 –  h)  (12) 
 
 
The optimal level of help is generated by maximizing equations (11) and (12) with 
respect to h. This leads to: 
 
0
* ln
1
j
j
F
nqr
q
h
 
(13) 
 
0
* ln
1
j
i
rF
nq
q
h  (14) 
 
 
 
 
9 
 Equation (13) measures the optimal level of help from the perspective of the 
helper, j, and equation (14) from the perspective of the person being helped, i. They 
can be seen as an upper and lower limit. We observe that individual j’s optimal level 
of help increases with an increase in society’s norm of helping (n) and the level of 
relatedness (r). 
 An alternative determinant of survival is based on sociobiology. It stresses the 
relevance of the ―procreation instinct.‖ As the survival of a species depends on its 
offspring, a high value must be placed upon females of reproductive age as a valuable 
resource. Social norms may be created to protect the reproductive and child-rearing 
role of women (higher n). It is an attempt to protect children rather than the result of a 
greater value put on women’s lives. A potential shortage of women would limit the 
number of offspring, while a shortage of men would not (see Felson 2000). In 
humans, the period of peak reproduction is between the ages of 16 and 35 (see 
A.S.R.M. 2003). Females (on average) are not reproductively functional before age 
15, and the reproductive cycle begins to slow down from age 35 to age 50 when the 
reproductive function is usually lost altogether. It has also been emphasized that the 
social norm of helping women may be related to the relative physical and structural 
vulnerability of women (see Felson 2000). 
 Females may also have a strong incentive to ensure the survival of their 
children in the event of a disaster like the Titanic (strong r relationship between child 
and mother). In anthropology, ―parental investment‖ is an important concept. It argues 
that the females of most species invest more in ensuring the survival of their offspring 
than the males. The females of the species are the ones who are responsible for their 
young during gestation and lactation, and they generally protect them from predators 
and educate them (see Geary 1998). The male contribution is usually much smaller. 
Because of the much larger investment on the part of the females, the opportunity cost 
of losing offspring is higher and the drive to ensure offspring survival is stronger (see 
Campbell 1999). It has been shown that the mortality rates of children with a mother 
are 1.4 times lower than those without a mother (see Voland 1998) and that the 
survival rates of offspring can be directly linked to maternal survival (see Bjorklund 
and Shackelford 1999). Under these conditions, it is to be expected that females with 
children would be much more alert to possible danger and would aggressively fight 
other females to ensure a safe haven (see Cashdan 1997). Moreover, it has been 
emphasized that it is the parent who has the greater investment in promoting the 
survival of offspring who is the more valued resource (see Trivers 1972; Eswaran and 
Kotwal 2004). 
 
 These sociobiological considerations lead to the following two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis N2: Women of reproductive age have a higher probability of survival due 
to being subject to a social norm of helping. 
 
Hypothesis N3: Women with children have a higher probability of survival than 
women without children. 
 
C. Social Determinant (S) 
A key norm under life and death conditions is that women and children are to be 
saved first (higher n). This norm may work directly in the sense that men let women 
and children board the lifeboats first. The norm may also have been supported 
institutionally, thus it could have worked indirectly if the officers in charge of loading 
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the lifeboats directed the male passengers to let women and children proceed first. 
Interestingly, there is no international maritime law that requires that women and 
children be rescued first. Similar norms can be found in other areas where people need 
to be evacuated. Humanitarian agencies often evacuate ―vulnerable‖ and ―innocent‖ 
civilians, such as women, children, and elderly people first. The Geneva Convention 
provides special protection and evacuation priority for pregnant women and mothers 
of young children (see Carpenter 2003). The following hypothesis tests whether this 
social norm was acted upon when the Titanic sank. 
 
Hypothesis S1: Women and children have a higher probability of survival than men. 
 
 Passengers traveling alone may be expected to have a lower chance of survival 
in life and death situations because they are less likely to receive information 
indirectly and to obtain psychological and physical support from others (lower r). On 
the other hand, being alone makes decision making less cumbersome and conflictive 
(lower transaction costs), increasing the survival chance of all (lower ). Following 
the (crude) homo oeconomicus concept centered on individualistic considerations, the 
advantage of being able to act alone and to only have to consider one’s own best 
interests seems to prevail. Moreover, a higher r increases j’s willingness to help i 
(e.g., one’s partner), but also reduces a partner’s incentive to request help. 
 
Hypothesis S2: Passengers traveling alone have a higher probability of survival than 
those traveling in a group (n  2). 
 
 The Titanic was built in Great Britain, operated by British subjects, and 
manned by a British crew.
16
 It is to be expected that national ties were activated 
during the disaster and that the crew would give preference to British subjects, easily 
identified by their language (higher r). In contrast, passengers from other nationalities, 
in particular Americans, Irish, and Scandinavians would be at a disadvantage. 
 
Hypothesis S3: British subjects have a higher chance of survival than people of other 
nationalities. 
 
II II II ..   The  Data  
The sinking of the RMS Titanic was a tragic event and resulted in a sorrowful loss of 
life. However, the event offers economic researchers an exceptional opportunity to 
control exogenous factors within a quasi-natural field experiment. The event itself is 
completely isolated, making the external shock applicable to every person aboard the 
ship and the exogenous factors the same for everyone. The event is such that every 
person is impacted by the shock and is unable to defer making a decision. Even if one 
chooses not to participate in the scramble for lifeboat seats, the outcome is the same 
as that of someone who does strive for a seat and fails. The great advantage of a 
natural field experiment is the randomization and realism. The participants do not 
know that their fate can be looked at as being the result of an (natural) experiment; 
their behavior is therefore unaffected (see Reiley and List 2008). 
                                                   
16
 Interestingly enough, the Ocean Steam Navigation Company, popularly known as the ―White Star‖ 
line because of the white star appearing on the company flag, was under the management of the 
industrial giant, J.P. Morgan. Nevertheless, the public perceived the Titanic as being a British ship. 
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 We have been able to construct a detailed dataset, despite the facts that the 
event occurred almost 100 years ago and the records were not very detailed. Our data 
consist of 2,207 persons who were confirmed to be aboard the R.M.S. Titanic. The 
data were gathered from the Encyclopedia Titanica and crosschecked with other 
sources.
17
 Summary statistics of the variables collected are reported in the Appendix 
(see Table A1). The dependent variable is whether someone survived or not. Out of 
2,207 passengers and crewmembers, 1,517 people died. Based on the records, we 
were able to gather information about the gender, age, nationality, port where people 
boarded the Titanic, ticket price and therefore the passenger-class status (first, second, 
or third class). In addition, we were able to generate individual information related to 
travel plans and companions. Limited information was available with regard to the 
cabin allocation (only 15.2 percent).
18
 Of the 2,207 persons onboard, the age of all but 
21 individuals is known. Thus, using age in the regression reduces the number of 
observations to 2,186 persons (see Table A1).
19
 Out of the 2,186 people onboard, 
1,300 were passengers and 886 crewmembers. Among the passengers, 43 were 
servants. Additionally, of the 2,186 aboard, 1,704 were male (78 percent), and 460 of 
the 1,300 passengers were female (35 percent). 
 We have complete information on each person’s country of residence 
(nationality). From this, we have been able to generate several variables to investigate 
the effects of nationality. We have created dummies for the most populous national 
groups aboard the Titanic. These include Great Britain (the largest group), Ireland, 
Sweden, the USA, and a group for all other nationalities. Passenger groupings have 
been identified by anecdotal evidence taken from family histories and known travel 
arrangements, ticket numbers, and cabin allocations.
20
 
 Because the impact of age is prominent in this investigation, it is important to 
use generally accepted groupings: children, adults, and older people. The United 
Nations standard for age, which classifies children as being fifteen years of age or 
under, is used. Among the 2,186 people aboard, 124 were children (65 girls and 59 
boys). Adulthood begins post childhood and ends at old age, defined by the British 
Royal Commission in 1894 as beginning at age 50.
21
 In humans, the peak 
reproductive age, as defined by the A.S.R.M., is between 15 and 35 years of age. 
There were 280 women out of the 2,186 people aboard between 16 and 35 years of 
age. 
 While there is some anecdotal conjecture that there may have been other 
people aboard (stowaways), the list of survivors corresponds to the ―official‖ 
passenger lists.
22
 
 
                                                   
17
 The cross-checked resources include: Beavis (2002), Bryceson (1997), Committee on Commerce 
(1912),
 
Eaton and Hass (1994),
 
Geller (1998), Howell (1999), Lord (1955),
 
Lord (1986), NSARM 
(2008), Quinn (1999), Ruffman (1999), U.S. National Archives (2008), Wreck Commissioner’s Court 
(1912). 
18
 The data also indicate that this information has been mainly provided by the survivors and is 
therefore biased. Moreover, as the iceberg was struck shortly before midnight, some passengers were 
not yet in their cabins, but somewhere else on the ship. 
19
 Out of these 21 people, four were crewmembers and 17 passengers. 
20
 Those passengers for whom there is no clear or known evidence were assumed to be traveling alone 
and assigned as single. 
21
 The British Royal Commission was based upon the payment of benefits from the friendly societies 
(unions) to its members who were too old to work; these benefits began at age 50. The Commission 
accepted the reasoning and adopted this for government-aged welfare. 
22
 This suggests that the unlisted ―illegal‖ passengers did not survive and may not have competed with 
―official‖ passengers for lifeboat spaces. 
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II V..   Econometric  Estimates  and  Results  
The nine hypotheses developed are empirically tested using probit estimates. The 
tables below show the estimated parameter and the significance level (indicated by z-
values). The respective marginal effects are also indicated. Table 1 deals with the 
economic and natural determinants and Table 2 with the social determinants. 
 
A. Testing Economic Determinants 
Table 1 presents the results of the first set of hypotheses, those relating to economic 
determinants. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
 The estimates are consistent with the hypotheses. According to equation (1), 
passengers in first class had a higher chance of survival than those in second class, 
and second-class passengers had a higher chance of survival than those in third class. 
The marginal effects suggest that a passenger in the highest class was 40 percent more 
likely to survive the catastrophe than a passenger in third class. A second-class 
passenger had a 16 percent higher chance of survival than somebody traveling in third 
class. These are large and robust differences. Adding controls for the gender 
composition of the various classes (equation 2) as well as possible effects of the crew 
(equation 3) has practically no impact on these marginal effects. Thus, hypothesis E1 
cannot be rejected. 
 Estimation equation (3) indicates that the crew had an 18 percent higher 
chance of survival than the passengers, controlling for passenger class and gender. 
This result is consistent with the second economic hypothesis (E2). 
 Consistent with hypothesis E3, the survival rate is higher among deck and 
engine crewmembers than among members of the rest of the crew. In particular, the 
deck crew were more likely to save themselves than other crewmembers. According 
to equation (4), the deck crew had a much higher (74 percent) chance of survival, 
compared to 39 percent for the engine crew and 32 percent for the victualing crew 
(always compared to the remaining crew). 
 
B. Testing Natural Determinants 
Table 1 also shows the results obtained with respect to the natural (sociobiological) 
determinants of surviving the catastrophe. Passengers in their prime (16 to 35 years of 
age) had an 18 percent higher chance of surviving the disaster (equation 5) than older 
people. These results are consistent with hypothesis N1. In line with the 
sociobiological hypotheses N2 and N3, females of childbearing age (16–35) had a 15 
percent higher probability of survival than older women (equation 8). In addition, if 
these women had a child, their survival probability was further increased by 16 
percent (equation 7). 
 
C. Testing Social Determinants 
Table 2 shows the social determinants of survival. 
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Table 2 about here 
 
 Equation (8) suggests that being a female or child had a highly significant 
positive effect on being saved. The probability of surviving is 53 percent higher for 
females than for males and 15 percent higher for children than for adults (i.e., age 16 
and above). The same effect can be observed for the crew where females even had a 
64 percent higher chance of being saved (equation 9). These results are consistent 
with hypothesis S1, suggesting that social norms were to some extent observed even 
under conditions of extreme duress. 
 Being aboard the Titanic as a single person did not increase the chance of 
survival (see equation 10). The advantage of lower transaction costs in the decision-
making process when traveling alone may have been overshadowed by psychological 
or even physical disadvantages and a lack of information. Thus, we can reject 
hypothesis S2. 
 Similarly, hypothesis S3 is refuted. As can be seen in equation 11, British 
subjects had a 10 percent lower chance of survival than passengers from other 
countries. This may be because the norms of being a ―gentleman,‖ even under 
extreme duress, were valid at that time in Britain. Estimation (12) shows that 
passengers from the USA had a 12 percent higher probability of survival than British 
subjects. 
 The last equation (13) in Table 2 includes all the social determinants. It is 
presented to indicate that the estimated parameters and marginal effects are quite 
robust. They are of similar magnitude, independent of which further determinants are 
included in the estimate. 
 A second test of the robustness of the estimated parameters is presented in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
 Instead of splitting up the sample of persons aboard the Titanic as in Tables 1 
and 2, Table 3 considers the complete sample and then captures the influence of 
gender by using interaction effects. As can be seen, the estimates are robust when the 
additional determinants relating to the crew, the reproductive age of women, and 
children are added. The qualitative results and the statistical significance remain 
unchanged when compared to the estimates in Tables 1 and 2. The most 
comprehensive estimate presented in equation (17) suggests that the survival 
probability more than doubles in its magnitude for women traveling in first class 
compared to males traveling in third class. Similarly, females traveling in second class 
have a 67 percent higher probability of surviving the disaster than our base group of 
third-class males. Men traveling in first class had a 30 percent higher chance of 
surviving than men traveling in third class, but there is no statistically significant 
difference between men traveling in second or third class. 
 A female member of the crew had a 59 percent higher probability of surviving 
the disaster than the male members of the crew and a 77 percent higher probability of 
surviving than non-crew male members. Female crewmembers have a 57 percent 
higher survival probability than non-crew women. In addition, male crewmembers 
had an 18 percent higher chance of survival than male non-crew members. 
 Women of reproductive age had a higher survival chance than males and 
females in other age categories. Female (male) children had a 77 percent (14 percent) 
higher probability of surviving than adults. Moreover, female children had a 62 
 
 
 
 
14 
percent higher survival probability than male children. Finally, those from the USA 
had a 9 percent higher chance to save themselves than the British. 
 In summary, the robustness test using interaction variables yields results 
consistent with all the hypotheses except S2.
23
 British passengers were less likely to 
try to save themselves than those from any other nation; this corresponds to the 
estimates presented in Table 2. 
 
V..   Conclusions  
The econometric estimates of the factors determining survival during the sinking of 
the Titanic produce a coherent story. However, this story is not necessarily in line 
with the simple model of selfish homo oeconomicus. While people in their prime were 
more likely to be saved, it was women—rather than men—who had a better chance of 
being saved. Children also had a higher chance of surviving. At the time of the 
disaster, the unwritten social norm of ―saving women and children first‖ seems to 
have been enforced. 
 There is also support for sociobiological explanations of who was saved and 
who perished. Women of reproductive age and women with children had a higher 
probability of being saved. 
 However, we do find evidence suggesting that the effects predicted using the 
standard homo oeconomicus model are also important. People in their prime drowned 
less often than older people. Passengers with high financial means, traveling in first 
class, were better able to save themselves as were passengers in second class 
(compared to third class). Crewmembers who had access to better informational and 
relational resources managed to survive more often than others aboard. This applies in 
particular to the deck crew who were partly in charge of the rescue operations. In 
contrast, the British passengers who were the same nationality as most of the 
crewmembers did not take advantage of this fact. They had a higher probability of 
perishing than other nationalities, thus exhibiting behavior consistent with the 
prevailing concept of being a gentleman. 
 The sinking of the Titanic represents a rare case of a well-documented and 
most dramatic life and death situation. However, even under these extreme situations, 
the behavior of human beings is not random or inexplicable, but can be accounted for 
by economic analysis. 
 
                                                   
23
 As argued above, many passengers were not yet in their cabins when the Titanic struck the iceberg. 
Those situated in first-class cabins, however, were closer to the lifeboats than passengers in second or 
third class. Unfortunately, there are only very sketchy data on where the cabins of those passengers on 
which we have data were located on the Titanic. We could only collect the respective information, and 
therefore the distance to the lifeboats in meters for 325 persons of which 64 percent survived. As the 
overall survival rate is 32 percent, this sample is likely to be highly skewed; that is, the information on 
the distance to the lifeboats comes predominantly from passengers who were saved. Nevertheless, even 
using this questionable and small sample, the estimates of the determinants discussed remain robust: 
the effects of gender, cabin class, and reproductive age remain statistically significant and of similar 
magnitude as in Tables 1 and 2. 
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Table 1 
Economic and Natural Determinants of Survival 
Probit 
Passenger Passenger All Crew 
Adult 
Passenger 
All 
Adult Female 
Passenger 
Adult Female 
Passenger 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1st Class 0.990*** 1.020*** 1.023***  1.309*** 2.156*** 2.158*** 
z-value 11.24 10.32 10.33  10.76 8.25 8.07 
marg.effect 0.378 0.387 0.387  0.484 0.43 0.417 
2nd Class 0.408*** 0.368*** 0.368***  0.318** 1.060*** 1.068*** 
z-values 4.46 3.59 3.58  2.79 5.59 5.57 
marg.effect 0.158 0.14 0.136  0.119 0.211 0.204 
Female  1.485*** 1.509*** 2.097*** 1.641***   
z-value  17.7 18.59 6.1 17.69   
marg.effect  0.536 0.547 0.694 0.581   
Female Age 
16–35 
      
0.528** 
 
0.572** 
z-value      2.83 3 
marg.effect      0.15 0.159 
Female Age 
16–35 
     
0.512*** 
  
z-value     4.66   
marg.effect     0.177   
Crew   0.496***     
z-value   6.21     
marg.effect   0.176     
Deck Crew    2.322***    
z-value    6.47    
marg.effect    0.744    
Engine Crew    1.211***    
z-value    3.65    
marg.effect    0.385    
Victualing 
Crew 
   1.091**    
z-value    3.32    
marg.effect    0.319    
Has Child 
/Children 
       
0.937* 
z-value       2.05 
marg.effect       0.158 
Obs. 1300 1300 2186 886 1178 401 401 
Prob.>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.276 0.203 0.12 0.328 0.249 0.26 
Notes: Dependent variable: Survival (value=1). The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 5, 
1, and 0.1% levels, respectively. Adult=Age>15. In the reference group: THIRD CLASS, MALE, PASSENGER 
(EQ3), A LA CARTE CREW (EQ4), AGE>36 (EQ5), FEMALE AGE>35 (EQ6 & EQ7), NOT HAVING A 
CHILD/CHILDREN (EQ7). 
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Table 2 
Social Determinants of Survival 
Probit Passenger Crew Passenger Passenger Passenger All 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Female 1.468*** 1.858*** 1.456*** 1.444*** 1.447*** 1.475*** 
z-value 17.44 5.50 16.77 16.58 16.41 17.38 
marg.effect 0.53 0.64 0.526 0.522 0.523 0.536 
Age Sub 15 
(Children) 
0.382**  0.807*** 0.808*** 0.821*** 0.754*** 
z-value 2.83  3.93 3.91 3.96 3.78 
marg.effect 0.148  0.313 0.313 0.318 0.289 
Age 16–50   0.470** 0.476** 0.479** 0.422** 
z-value   2.99 3.01 3.03 2.86 
marg.effect   0.161 0.162 0.163 0.132 
1st Class 1.066***  1.140*** 1.122*** 1.075*** 1.072*** 
z-value 10.62  10.75 10.55 9.00 9.09 
marg.effect 0.403  0.429 0.423 0.406 0.404 
2nd Class 0.387***  0.407*** 0.500*** 0.471*** 0.451*** 
z-value 3.74  3.90 4.51 4.10 3.97 
marg.effect 0.148  0.155 0.191 0.180 0.168 
Traveling Alone   -0.057 -0.070 -0.078 -0.071 
z-value   -0.62 -0.76 -0.84 -0.77 
marg.effect   -0.021 -0.026 -0.029 -0.024 
England (1,143)    -0.268*   
z-value    -2.56   
marg.effect    -0.096   
Ireland (114)     0.238 0.180 
z-value     1.37 1.10 
marg.effect     0.091 0.065 
Sweden (106)     0.090 0.053 
z-value     0.52 0.31 
marg.effect     0.034 0.019 
USA (424)     0.309* 0.258* 
z-value     2.49 2.39 
marg.effect     0.116 0.093 
All Others (399)     0.283* 0.237* 
z-value     2.37 2.19 
marg.effect     0.106 0.085 
Crew       0.644*** 
z-value      5.47 
marg.effect      0.228 
Obs. 1300 886 1300 1300 1300 2186 
Prob.>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.280 0.041 0.286 0.290 0.291 0.212 
Notes: Dependent variable: Survival (value = 1). The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 5, 
1, and 0.1% levels, respectively. In the reference group: MALE, AGE>15 (EQ8), AGE >50 (EQ10-EQ13), THIRD 
CLASS, GROUP (couples with and without children and/or servants, singles with children and/or servants, 
extended group also covering friends), NOT FROM ENGLAND, (EQ11), ENGLAND (EQ12 & EQ13), 
PASSENGER (EQ13). 
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Table 3 
Robustness Test Including Interaction Terms 
Probit All All All All 
(14) (15) (16) (17) 
Female 1.054*** 0.942*** 0.710*** 0.532** 
z-value 9.86 8.21 4.61 3.17 
marg.effect 0.395 0.354 0.267 0.199 
Age   -0.014*** -0.010* 
z-value   -4.36 -2.60 
marg.effect   -0.005 -0.003 
1st Class 0.640*** 0.603*** 0.790*** 0.777*** 
z-value 4.96 4.65 5.71 5.59 
marg.effect 0.243 0.229 0.301 0.296 
2nd Class -0.008 -0.047 -0.008 -0.015 
z-value -0.05 -0.32 -0.06 -0.10 
marg.effect -0.003 -0.017 -0.003 -0.005 
Crew  0.443*** 0.377** 0.451*** 0.492*** 
z-value 3.85 3.22 3.76 4.04 
marg.effect 0.159 0.135 0.162 0.178 
Ireland  0.268 0.294 0.223 0.245 
z-value 1.67 1.84 1.36 1.50 
marg.effect 0.100 0.110 0.082 0.091 
Sweden 0.125 0.129 0.114 0.091 
z-value 0.74 0.77 0.68 0.54 
marg.effect 0.045 0.047 0.041 0.033 
USA 0.242* 0.237* 0.259* 0.249* 
z-value 2.19 2.15 2.32 2.22 
marg.effect 0.088 0.087 0.095 0.091 
All Others  0.238* 0.236* 0.184 0.175 
z-value 2.18 2.17 1.67 1.57 
marg.effect 0.087 0.086 0.067 0.064 
Traveling Alone -0.120 -0.136 -0.082 -0.032 
z-value -1.34 -1.52 -0.89 -0.34 
marg.effect -0.042 -0.047 -0.029 -0.011 
Children    0.379* 
z-value    2.08 
marg.effect    0.143 
1st Class* Female 1.118*** 1.225*** 1.337*** 1.402*** 
z-value 4.55 4.92 5.14 5.25 
marg.effect 0.424 0.459 0.494 0.513 
2nd Class* Female 1.088*** 1.197*** 1.260*** 1.284*** 
z-value 4.95 5.35 5.53 5.56 
marg.effect 0.414 0.450 0.470 0.477 
Crew* Female  0.906* 0.982** 1.034** 
z-value  2.53 2.77 2.93 
marg.effect  0.349 0.376 0.395 
Reproductive Age* Female   0.334* 0.523** 
z-value   2.20 3.01 
marg.effect   0.124 0.199 
Children* Female    1.118* 
z-value    2.48 
marg.effect    0.423 
Obs. 2186 2186 2186 2186 
Prob.>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.221 0.224 0.234 0.238 
Notes: Dependent variable: Survival (value = 1). The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 5, 1, and 0.1% 
levels, respectively. Reference group: Male, 3rd Class, England, Not Traveling Alone, Not a Child (EQ17).  
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Table A1 
Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
SURVIVED
 
 0.320 0.467 0 1 2207 
FEMALE
 
 0.220 0.414 0 1 2207 
AGE 30.044 11.610 1 74 2186 
AGE< 16 (CHILDREN) 0.052 0.221 0 1 2186 
AGE 16-50 0.891 0.312 0 1 2186 
FEMALE 16-35
 
 0.128 0.334 0 1 2186 
1st CLASS 0.147 0.354 0 1 2207 
2nd CLASS 0.129 0.335 0 1 2207 
TRAVELING ALONE 0.217 0.412 0 1 2207 
ENGLAND
 
 0.527 0.499 0 1 2207 
IRELAND
 
 0.052 0.221 0 1 2207 
SWEDEN 0.048 0.214 0 1 2207 
USA  0.192 0.394 0 1 2207 
OTHER NATIONALITIES 0.181 0.385 0 1 2207 
CREW 0.403 0.491 0 1 2207 
Sources: The Encyclopedia Titanica (2008) has been used as the primary source, which was 
crosschecked across the following resources: Beavis (2002), Bryceson (1997), Committee on 
Commerce (1912), Eaton and Hass (1994), Geller (1998), Howell (1999), Lord (1955), Lord (1988), 
NSARM (2008), Quinn (1999), Ruffman (1999), U.S. National Archives (2008), Wreck 
Commissioner’s Court (1912). 
